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Channel litigation, 11 as to whether to defend the 
blanket refusal of the British Navy to provide cer­
tain documents to the ICJ that might have thrown 
new light on the legality of the passage of British 
warships through the Corfu Channel, events that 
underlay the adjudicated incident. The mixed loy­
alties of international lawyers to their national 
legal systems and to the international legal system, 
as well as the bureaucratization of public life, may 
complicate the task of creating a just world order. 
Yet, Reisman stipulates that the individual deci­
sion maker must operate under difficult condi­
tions to make a significant difference in this 
regard. Thus, according to Reisman, rhe norma­
tive theory explaining the structures of interna­
tional law serves as a backdrop against which the 
legality and morality of specific decisions should 
be evaluated. In his view, the individual is situated 
at the epicenter of our legal universe: international 
law norms are designed to protect human dignity, 
and their application depends on the ethical con­
victions of the individual decision maker. 
In sum, The Quest for World Order is an excel­
lent introduction to international legal theory, 
offering a comprehensive understanding of the 
building blocks of the international legal system 
and the fundamental tensions and dialectics 
informing irs lawmaking and law-applying pro­
cesses. By immersing the reader in one of the most 
influential approaches to international law-pol­
icy-oriented jurisprudence- by defending its 
continued relevance and by developing a typology 
facilitating a critical, up-to-date, and value-based 
analysis of legal norms and institutions, Reisman 
presents students of international law with a rich 
vocabulary for investigating the promise and lim­
its of international law. While Reisman's own 
quest for world order is at rimes open to criticism 
for diluting some of the qualities that provide law 
with the very ability to create order, the functional 
perspective that he offers is always intellectually 
stimulating. Moreover, while his quest for human 
dignity may at times downplay the importance of 
legal texts and mechanisms that do not serve an 
immediately apparent functional purpose (such as 
unenforceable international judgments), Reis-
11 Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ REP. 4 
(Apr. 9). 
man's determination to explain international law 
as a legal system applied by individuals for the sake 
of individuals is compelling. Ultimately, it is the 
combination of the rwo quests that Reisman pur­
sues that renders his contribution to international 
legal theory so important. His functionalism is not 
a value-neutral description of a world order, but 
rather a multifaceted process for promoting 
human dignity. 
YlNALSHANY 
Faculty of Law, Hebrew University ofjerusalem 
International Law in the US. Supreme Court: Con­
tinuity and Change. Edited by David L. Sloss, 
Michael D. Ramsey, and WilliamS. Dodge. 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011. Pp. xxxvi, 681. Index. $166,£103, 
cloth; $62, £39.99, paper. 
International Law in the US. Supreme Court: 
Continuity and Change explores the doctrinal his­
tory of international law in the Supreme Court 
from the Founding to the present day. Edited by 
David Sloss of Santa Clara University School of 
Law, Michael Ramsey of the University of San 
Diego Law School, and Bill Dodge of the Univer­
sity of California Hastings College of the Law, it 
seeks "to cover all cases or lines of cases [in the 
Supreme Court] in which international law has 
played a material role, showing how rhe Court's 
treatment of international law has developed 
throughout the Court's history" (p. 2). Simply 
put, it is a terrific work, whether read as a treatise 
or an original piece of scholarship. 
For an edited volume, the book shows impres­
sive cohesion. Ir is organized first by time, with 
groups of chapters addressing the four periods 
ranging from the Founding to rhe Civil War, and 
from then to the year 1900, to World War II, and 
to the year 2000. Within each time period, the 
chapters are further divided along three main 
themes: the Supreme Court's treatment of treaties, 
customary international law, and international 
law as an interpretive tool. The last part of the 
book contains point-and-counterpoint opinion 
pieces about recent Supreme Court cases. 
The decision to look at all Supreme Court cases 
dealing with international law leads to fresh per­
spectives and new insights. This approach puts 
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well-known cases in their comext and brings new 
ones to lighc. Thus, Michael Van Alstine's chapter 
covering treaties from 190 1 to 1945 convincingly 
shows that Missouri v. Holland "actually plowed 
very little new constitutional ground," (p. 199) 
with its canonic status resting instead on its syn­
thesis and expression of existing doctrines. That 
chapter also highlights largely forgotten cases like 
Fok Young Yo v. United States, which held that a 
treaty can delegate regulatory authority to the 
executive branch. Paul Stephan's chapter on trea­
ties from 1946 to 2000 makes the imeresting 
observation that, though during this period the 
Court noted the principle that deference is owed 
to the views of the executive branch when imer­
preting treaties, the Court often did not, in prac­
tice, state or apply this principle, especially on 
issues of private law. These are only a few examples 
of the fine-grained insights that come out of the 
book's methodological approach. 
The book's most important comribution is in 
its identification of broader doctrinal themes. The 
authors of the separate chapters provide a clear 
doctrinal narrative, and a final chapter by Sloss, 
Ramsey, and Dodge ties these narratives together. 
They find that the Supreme Court's approach to 
treaties was largely continuous from the Founding 
through World War II, bur that the Court has sub­
sequently displayed "newfound reluctance to use 
treaties as a tool to constrain government power" 
(p. 592)-in particular, by changing the canons of 
interpretation that it relies upon and by increasing 
the barriers to judicial enforcement of treaties. For 
customary international law, they deem the story 
"more cyclical" (p. 594), with direct application of 
customary international law strong until the early 
twentieth cemury but then limited umil the 
revival of the Alien Tort Statute.1 They conclude 
that the Court has frequently used international 
1 This book was published before the Supreme 
Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 5. Ct. 1659 (2013), which has reduced the pros­
pects for litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. Kiobel 
was the subject of an International Decision in the July 
2013 issue of AJIL; the Agora "Reflections on Kiobel" 
was published in the Ocrober 2013 issue; and the Agora 
was extended in January 2014 with the online publi­
cation of AJIL UNBOUND. The entire set of articles 
is available at http://www.asil.org/resources/american­
journal-international-law. 
law in both constitutional and statutory imerpre­
tation across all four time periods, but with vari­
ations in how much it is used and in whether 
it furthers or constrains governmental power. By 
drawing these overall conclusions, the editors map 
the cominuity and change that they have docu­
mented-and do so in a way that will help scholars 
put new developmems in Supreme Court practice 
. . 
m perspective. 
The analysis in the book is especially useful 
because it comes with powerful markers of credi­
bility. If ever there was a book with built-in checks 
and balances, this is ic. To begin with, prior work 
by the editors and authors demonstrates that they 
are a widely mixed group in terms of their norma­
tive and interpretive approaches. But the book 
does not simply depend on these differences to 
smooth out its content. Instead, it affirmatively 
seeks out self-criticism by including a number of 
chapters that are effectively book reviews of the 
book itself (with each review targeted at, and con­
tained in, a particular section of the book). John 
Fabian Witt, Edward Purcell, and Martin Flaherty 
contribute chapters assessing the contributions for 
particular time periods. Witt, in particular, does 
not hesitate to dish out criticism. The final section 
of the book relies even more strongly on back-and­
forth, with lead essays on recent Supreme Court 
cases immediately followed by response essays cri­
tiquing those essays. All this internal engagement 
signals that, in keeping with the best scholarly tra­
dition, the authors have "kept [their] mind[s] 
open to criticism" and followed the practice of " lis­
ten [ing] to all that could be said against [them] ."2 
Wirh the book's focus on providing excellent 
doctrinal history, however, comes an inevitable 
insularity. It conveys a good sense of what the 
Supreme Court has done in cases involving inter­
national law, but there is little overall account of 
why. Is the Court acting out of fidelity to doctrinal 
and interpretive traditions? Is it responding to his­
torical context, to perceived functional needs, to 
developments in the political branches? Do theo­
ries from international relations explain-or fail 
to explain-aspects of the continuity and change 
documented here? Witt's chapter raises many 
2 jOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 12 (1859) 
(1921 ed.). 
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of these questions (and emphasizes the book's 
absence of social history), bur the book as a whole 
does not attempt to answer them. 3 
We do get tantalizing hints of cause and effect 
in some of rhe individual chapters. Writing about 
treary cases between the Civil War and 1900, for 
example, Duncan Hollis observes that during this 
period there developed "a more nuanced-and 
some might say less respectful-vision of treaties' 
place in the U.S. constitutional system" (p. 56) 
than had been present earlier. Hollis offers some 
possible lines of explanation, and observes that 
many of the treaties adjudicated during this period 
were between the United States and Indian tribes 
or non-European nations with whom "the United 
States frequently held rhe upper hand" (p. 59) 
and might harbor racial bias against-unlike ear­
lier treaty cases involving European nations. 
Other essays in the book also explore how power 
dynamics may influence the Court's jurispru­
dence, such as an elegant opinion piece by Ralf 
Michaels on F Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empa­
gran S.A. (a 2004 extraterritoriality decision), but 
it is a theme left to individual authors to pursue or 
nor, and thus is only intermictencly present in the 
book. 
It is true rhat rhis book is primarily about 
doctrinal history and that a broader narrative is 
beyond its scope. Indeed, the editors say just that 
in their introduction w the book. Yet the book 
plainly seeks to link up the past with the present, 
as shown by the decision to include a final section 
of opinion essays on recent Supreme Court cases. 
Without a broader narrative, however, the book 
provides little basis for projecting into the 
future-for example, what Supreme Court juris­
prudence in relation to international law is likely 
to be in 2050 or even 2020. The book will be espe­
cially valuable, however, as an aid in constructing 
arguments rooted in doctrinal precedem and in 
understanding how those precedents apply to con­
temporary legal problems. 
3 See also Mary L. Dudziak, Toward a Geopolitics of 
the History of International Law in the Supreme Court, 
105 ASIL PROC. 532, 534-37 (2011) (critiquing the 
book as failing to engage adequately with the relation­
ship between the Cold War and the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence). 
This is an exceptionally lively era of Supreme 
Court engagement with international law. 
Between 2000 and the publication of this book 
in 2011, the Supreme Court decided lvfedellin v. 
Texas, Sosa v. A!varez-Machain, Roper v. Simmons, 
F Hoffinan La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., and 
Hamdan v. Rumsftld-all of which, among others 
from the same period, are discussed in the book's 
final section. And since 2011, the Supreme Court 
has continued its busy streak, with the last few 
years bringing Kiobe! v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
more cases from the war on terror, and the pending 
Bond v. United States. Overall, the Court's deci­
sions have reflected a new assertiveness, marked by 
its willingness to go against the positions taken by 
the executive branch and to revisit its precedents. 
One way to evaluate the import of the doctrinal 
history presented in International Law in the US. 
Supreme Court is to ask whether and how that his­
tory informs the book's final section, with irs five 
separate exchanges-each having a lead essay and 
two essays in response-on recent Supreme Court 
cases. The answer is mixed, as these exchanges 
showcase both the benefits and the limits of that 
history. 
Consider the essay by Mark T ushnet and the 
responses by Roger Alford and Melissa Waters, all 
dealing with Roper v. Simmons and other recent 
Supreme Court cases using non-U.S. sources in 
constitutional interpretation-an issue of ongo­
ing academic debate. Tushnet argues that this 
practice "was entirely routine throughout U.S. 
constitutional history" and that "[w]hat has 
changed is that ... [it] became controversial at the 
turn of the twenty-first century" (p. 511 ). He attri­
butes this controversy to the rise of originalism 
and, more hesitantly, to "anxieties about the 
nation's position in the international community" 
(p. 516). Alford challenges the use of non-U.S. 
sources as inherently problematic because of the 
risks of cherry-picking. He considers Tushnet's 
argumem about current anxieties to be "novel but 
unconvincing, " considering that if "the debate 
is really about national identity, we should have 
been having this argumenr long ago" (p. 521). 
Waters observes that, though the Supreme Court 
has used non-U.S. sources in constitutional inter­
pretation in the past, what is unique about Roper 
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and other recent cases is that they belong to an 
"emerging transnational judicial dialogue among 
the world's constitutional courts on human rights 
issues " (p. 523). 
The doctrinal history revealed earlier in this 
book establishes that the Supreme Court has used 
international law in constitutional interpretation 
for centuries before Roper. As Sarah Cleveland 
wrote in an article engaging in a similar historical 
analysis, this precedent "answers the legitimacy 
objection that international law is 'foreign' to the 
American constitutional tradition."4 Tush net and 
Waters build upon this established fact, and 
Alford does not challenge it. Indeed, the doctrinal 
history set forth in this book goes further by estab­
lishing that the use of international human rights 
law in U.S. constitutional interpretation goes back 
well before the current controversies. Independent 
of whether prior use of international law in inter­
preting constitutional issues like war and sover­
eignty supports its use in the human rights con­
text, the practice has been around in relation to 
human rights for over half a century. Trop v. DulLes 
and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez are the leading 
examples from the 1950s and 1960s. 
Yet even from a doctrinal perspective, the his­
tory covered in this book is not perfectly suited for 
grounding the current debate. In some ways it is 
roo broad. The coverage of every Supreme Court 
case dealing materially wit� the use of interna­
tional law in constitutional interpretation is of 
great interest from a scholarly perspective, but it 
does not lend itself all that readily to how public 
debate is conducted. That is, both opinion pieces 
and advocacy positions are likely to rely upon the 
cases that, for whatever reason, are already known 
and conceptualized as part of the canon. This is 
perhaps a fault of advocacy, bur it is one that schol­
arship must contend with in order to have an 
impact. For example (one taken from the book 
itself), in choosing historical examples to illustrate 
his argument, Mark Tushnet relies on the "Bran­
deis Brief" (in Mufler v. Oregon), Justice Jackson's 
Youngstown concurrence, and Kennedy v. Men­
doza-Martinez for their use of comparative or 
international law. All of these examples are cov-
4 Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitu­
tion, 31 YALE]. INT'L L l, 7 (2006). 
ered previously in International Law in the US. 
Supreme Court, but they have also featured previ­
ously in scholarly debate. The first two, in partic­
ular, have already gained positions of prominence 
in our constitutional narrative. It remains to be 
seen whether some of the less notable cases covered 
in this book will influence the present debate. 
In other ways, the doctrinal history covered in 
this book leaves the story of international law's 
place in constitutional interpretation incomplete. 
It does not, for example, cover the use of inter­
national law in constitutional interpretation by 
the political branches of governmenr.5 Nor does it 
cover historical debates over the use of non-U.S. 
sources by domestic courts other than the 
Supreme Court. Drawing on the doctrinal history 
set forth in this book, T ushnet finds the backlash 
against the use of non-U.S. sources in constim­
tional interpretation to be a novel development. 
And so it is, based upon this doctrinal history, bur 
a broader perspective on rhe role of non-U.S. 
sources in domestic courts- one going outside 
the context of the Supreme Court and constitu­
tional interpretation-may offer more analogies. 
If anything, today's backlash brings to mind the 
resistance by state legislatures and some state 
courts to citing English case law in the early nine­
teenth century-a backlash occasioned in part by 
anti-English and pro-French sentiment. At that 
rime, "(u]nder the influence of such ideas, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Kentucky legislated 
against citation of English decisions in the 
courts .... [A]nd more than one judge elsewhere 
had his fling at the English authorities cited before 
him."6 
In short, the doctrinal history in this book pro­
vides valuable guidance on the issue of using inter­
narional law in constitutional interpretation. But 
because the book is limited to Supreme Court 
cases and avoids broader social-science and histor­
ical narratives, its account provides neither a full 
doctrinal picture nor an underlying explanation of 
5 See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the 
Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REv. 987, 
1008-32 (2013) (exploring how international law has 
influenced how the political branches have interpreted 
the separation of foreign affairs powers). 
6 Roscoe Pound, The Pioneers and the Common Law, 
27 W.VA. L.Q. I, 7 (1921). 
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this picture. Nor does it answer the first-order 
question of the extent to which prior doctrine and 
practice should shape contemporary constitu­
tional interpretation. The editors are explicitly 
aware of these limits, but their significance 
becomes most apparent when thinking about the 
final section of essays in relation to the earlier por­
tions of the book. 
It will thus be interesting to see how practitio­
ners use this book going forward. Regardless, 
Sloss, Ramsey, Dodge, and the other authors have 
provided an invaluable contribution to the schol­
arship on the Supreme Court and international 
law. 
jEAN GALBRAITH 
Rutgers Schoof of Law-Camden 
Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human 
Rights, and the Law of the Commons. By Burns 
H. Weston and David Bollier. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 
xxvi, 363. Index. $99. 
From the beginning of the modern environ­
mental movement in the 1960s, some activists and 
scholars have argued that the environmental chal­
lenges we face are roo large to be solved within our 
existing legal and political framework, and that we 
can meet them only by fundamentally changing 
the way that we think about and act towards 
natural resources. Sometimes called neo-Ma!thu­
sians, they have argued not only, as Mal thus did, 1 
that a growing population will run short of food, 
but also that we will exhaust non-renewable 
resources.2 That global population growth has 
greatly slowed in recent decades does not solve the 
problem, in their view, because consumption con­
tinues to rise at unsustainable rates. In the last 
twenty years, climate change has become the 
clearest example to many neo-Malthusians that 
1 THOMAS MAL THUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCI­
PLE OF POPULATION (1798). 
2 See, e.g., LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B: RESCUING 
A PLANET UNDER STRESS AND A CIVILIZATION IN 
TROUBLE (2003); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULA­
TION BOMB (1968) ; GARRETT HARDIN, THE 
OSTRICH FACTOR: OUR POPULATION MYOPIA 
(1999); DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS 
TO GROWTH (1 972). 
the world has natural, non-negotiable limits to 
economic growth, which we cannot exceed with­
out causing catastrophic damage to the environ­
ment and to ourselves. 
The idea that our current trajectory may lead to 
environmental disaster has become part of popular 
culture,3 but it has yet to convince us to change 
course. No alternative to our growth-oriented eco­
nomic system has achieved widespread support, 
perhaps because none has seemed both environ­
mentally satisfactory and politically viable. With 
their new book, Burns Weston and David Bollier 
aim to change that. They put forward a proposal 
that they hope will lead to a revolution in environ­
mental governance. 
They begin by citing the apocalyptic projec­
tions of writers such as James Lovelock, who pre­
dicts that unchecked climate change may cause the 
global population to drop below one billion by the 
year 2100 (p. xvii).4 Weston and Bollier blame our 
situation on the failures of "the neoliberal State 
and Market alliance that has shown itself, despite 
impressive success in boosting material output, 
incapable of meeting human needs in ecologically 
responsible, socially equitable ways" (p. 3). Their 
criticism of the Market is the familiar one that it 
does not internalize environmental costs; their 
criticism of the State is that it is unwilling or 
unable to protect natural resources from the 
Market. They point to many reasons for this fail­
ure, including that "there is a cultural consensus 
that the mission of government is ... to promote 
development through constant economic 
growth," (p. 10) and that "the State is too inden­
tured to Market interests and too institutionally 
incompetent to deal with the magnitude of so 
many distributed ecological problems" (p. 20). 
Having brieBy sketched the picture of a rapidly 
deteriorating environment, plundered by a rapa­
cious Market that the State is helpless to regulate, 
the authors spend the rest of the book presenting 
an alternative to the current political/legal system. 
3 Recenr films depicting a future environmental 
dystopia include A. I. Artificial Inrelligence (200 1); The 
Day After Tomorrow (2004); Wall-E (2008) ; Metro pia 
(2009) ; and Elysium (2013) 
4 See jEFF GOODELL, HOW TO COOL THE 
PLANET: GEOENGINEERING AND THE AUDAClOUS 
QUEST TO FIX EARTH'S CLIMATE 89-90 (2010) . 
